With upcoming elections later this week, the EU is trying to sway the Serbians to vote west, west, west. The EU has just made a deal with Serbia to make it easier to get visas...perhaps suggesting that if the elections go the way they want they could be heading towards full membership along the road.
check out this interview with Goran Svilanovic who represents the Belgrade Centre for Human Rights. From 2000-2004 he was the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia and Montenegro and president of the reformist Civic Alliance of Serbia.
http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-enormous-investment-serbia/article-172258
Friday, May 9, 2008
Transformation in Post-Communist Serbia (final paper, woaaaah!)
Transformation in Post-Communist Serbia:
Redefining a Nation
Since the collapse of Communism, Serbia has undergone profound transformations, up to and including the physical definition of the state and its boundaries. From the dismantling of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Kosovo’s recent breakaway, it has struggled to establish itself politically, economically and culturally in post-Communist Europe. After the “transition from one illegitimate system (communism) to another illegitimate system (extreme nationalism)” (Pavlakovic 8), Serbia began to crack down on corruption and work towards a stable democracy, only to find itself in a new crisis with the secession of Kosovo. Considerable dissension over what direction the country should take at this critical point has led to the dissolution of the parliament, with new elections scheduled for May 15th. The issue of Kosovo is the end of a long chain of nationalist resurgence that has greatly shaped the situation Serbia, as the country strives to define itself in post-Communist Europe.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Corruption and Collapse
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created after World War II, contained the now independent states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and the disputed independent state of Kosovo (“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”). Leader Josep Broz Tito made Yugoslavia one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War (“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”). Under the slogan of “brotherhood and unity”, Tito employed market socialism in hopes that economic interests would supercede regional ethnic tensions (Gagnon 2). Yet although living standards and economic growth rate of Yugoslavia were among the highest in Eastern Europe, this would not be sufficient to hold the country together forever (Gagnon 2).
Under Communism, Yugoslavia was separated into largely autonomous districts, and “instead of the center running the entire economy, there were eight centers running eight economies” (Gagnon 3). Under this system, Serbia contained some of the most and least developed regions of Yugoslavia, and despite efforts to foster economic equality, poorly planned policies of investment and development focusing on heavy industry only widened the gap between them (Thomas 27). The greater Belgrade region was the largest manufacturing center in Yugoslavia, noted for its considerable consumer goods and food processing sector, however the province of Kosovo had high unemployment, up to 54% in the 1980s and its natural resources were largely squandered due to poor management (Thomas 27).
After Tito’s death, Yugoslavia became increasingly embroiled in ethnic tensions and burgeoning nationalism and the economy was by then in need of serious reform. “During the 1980s, the structural weaknesses of the Yugoslav economy were becoming increasingly evident” (Thomas 26). “In a situation of hyperinflation of over 10,000% yearly, falling production, high unemployment, a large foreign debt, domestic monetary chaos and accumulated structural economic problems,” Prime Minister Markovic's reform program attempted to privatize sectors of the Yugoslav economy, and centralize the monetary policy by putting it into the hands of the federal government (Lazic and Sekelj). The latter act however did not gain full political support, because in Slovenia and Croatia non-Communist political parties came to power in parliamentary elections in 1990, mandating the creation of independent states (Lazic and Sekelj). In this way, the economy became entangled in political and nationalist conflict that eventually led to the dissolution of the SFRY.
The Markovic reform program was aimed at creating an integrated Yugoslav market, and its failure sealed the fate of the republic, as reform conflicted with nationalist party interests (Gagnon 4). “The former Yugoslavia is a case where the integrative processes of state identity formation” ultimately failed (Sekulic et. al. 84). Furthermore, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences was among the most prominent critics of the federal government, claiming it supported an “anti-Serbian coalition in Yugoslavia” (Gagnon 5). It is at this point, in the late 1980s, that Slobodan Milosevic gained power, consolidating his control over the Serbian party organization by catering to nationalist sentiments that Serbia had been ill-served by the current political system (Gagnon 5).
Then, “in 1992, Yugoslavia formally dissolved in all out war” (Milosavljevic 51).
The Milosevic Era: Nationalism and the Outbreak of War
By 1992, four countries declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian President Milosevic was opposed to the secession of these states and claimed the large minority of Serbs within their borders had the right to stay in Yugoslavia and that the Yugoslav Constitution gave the right of self-determination to populations (Serbs, Croats, etc) as a whole, not republics (Serbia, Croatia, etc) (Lukic 56). “In essence, this was about the concept of a Serbian Yugoslavia, politically dominated by the Serbian people,” a union forming “the Greater Serbia”, rather than an egalitarian federation, to which the other nations of Yugoslavia were not willing to subscribe (Stojanovic 461). He used confrontational rhetoric to insist that Serbian outside the Serb border were in danger, Moving from Communist ideology to nationalist ideology, “with nation replacing class…opponents of the regime became enemies of the state” (Gordy “The Culture of Power…” 12). This provoked extremists in Croatia to stage a Croatian Serb rebellion (Gagnon 15), and later Bosnia and Herzegovina was also thrust into war when Bosnian Serbs captured as much as 70% of the country (“Slobodan Milosevic”). The situation then deteriorated into a series of wars fought over the span of nearly a decade in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“Slobodan Milosevic”).
During this time, Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and refused to apply for membership to international organizations, insisting that their new state was automatically entitled to those positions formerly held by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Lukic 57). “This absurd situation of perpetuating a nonexistent republic had repercussions in the FRY,” leaving it in a state of political limbo, with the flag of the defunct SFRY flying outside UN headquarters, although this was not the flag of the FRY (Lukic 57). Furthermore, it was partially excluded from UN activity, and suspended from other international organizations (Lukic 57). Additionally, Serbia became more and more distanced from Western European ideas and traditions over the course of the war. The premier newspaper Politika contained anti-Western sentiment, along with nationalist rhetoric in order to bolster support for the Serbian nation-state ideal and the war (Perovic 111). It would not be until after Milosevic that Serbia would again reach out to the West, and reapply for membership to international organizations.
Back at home, Serbia became highly controlled under Milosevic, and at the same time highly corrupt. The FRY was born into dramatic economic failure, and the government was “disinclined to institute any serious attempt at reform as any diminution of state control over the social and economic apparatus would also diminish” its power (Thomas 163-4). Furthermore, the ruling elite regained control of major enterprises that had become privatized before the dissolution of the SFRY (Lazic). Economic collapse forced many in the professional class to emigrate, and animosity between urban and agricultural sectors intensified, as peasants refused to sell their produce to city dwellers for worthless dinars, and blamed the lack of petrol and fertilizers on the inefficiency of urban bureaucrats (Thomas 166). Furthermore, the remnants of the previous command economy meant the presence of a strong black market which laid the groundwork for Milosevic’s government to “intentionally merge its law-enforcing institutions with organized crime to set up an extensive system of gray and black economies to circumvent sanctions” (“Partners in Crime…” 43). Thus the Serbian State Security Service (SDB) was highly corrupt under Milosevic, dealing with opposition to the regime, organizing paramilitary formations and channels for the networking of smuggling and money laundering (Jovanovic).
Despite the social and economic crisis in Serbia, war is what truly defined the Milosevic era, as it was interwoven with every aspect of life. Trafficking was often for arms to fight in Bosnia (“Partners in Crime”). War contributed to the deterioration of international relations in Serbia, and eventually led to the collapse of the FRY and the Milosevic regime (Thomas 251). Shortly after NATO intervention in Kosovar conflict in 1999, Milosevic was voted out of office, and in 2003, Serbia shifted definitions again to become the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, until 2006 when Montenegro seceded to become the newest independent country in the world, not counting the disputed situation of Kosovo (“Slobodan Milosevic”).
Post-Milosevic: Continued Conflict and Reform
Serbia has struggled greatly with reorienting its political and economic landscape since Milosevic. With the murder of President Zoran Djindjic by a member of Zemun clan in 2003, Serbia began a large scale crackdown on organized crime (Gordy, “Serbia and Djindjic…” 7), and also rounding up war criminals. It has proved difficult to dismantle the significant amount of corruption in the public and private sector (Ristic 1). However, despite the persistence of crime and corruption in the aftermath of Milosevic’s heavy hand of authoritarian control, Serbia also regained full membership in the UN— “its frontiers with neighbors were opened, the dinar became relatively stable, the country was admitted in the Council of Europe and it applied for membership in the Partnership for Peace” (Pribcevic 1). Furthermore, after the Yugoslav Wars, Serbia has been receiving more direct foreign investment and capital as it attempts to reform the economy (Ristic 15). Thus, like other countries in the Balkans, Serbia is looking to the West and the European Union for support and political inspiration (Rupnik 1), although recently, relations have been strained over the secession of Kosovo, which has proved the most contentious issue in recent Serbian politics.
Kosovo is a prime example of what can happen in areas without a clear nation-state. “Where state borders are contestable and unstable, liberal and democratic principles—the rights of individuals and their political equality as citizens—are eclipsed by the logically prior question: who belongs?” (Batt 14). Since the collapse of Communism, Serbia has struggled mightily with this question in its efforts to forge a Yugoslav union or a “greater Serbia”, and now, with Kosovo, it is raised again. In this instance, Serbia has been as yet unwilling to recognize Kosovo as a separate state, and plans to open polls there for Serbian elections in May (Robinson).
The Kosovo issue also poses an obstacle to Serbian integration into the European Union, as most countries in the EU recognize Kosovo as an independent country, among other issues including hiding war criminals, and problems with integrating the economy (Batt 33). Indeed, Kosovo’s secession is the reason that Boris Tadic dissolved the Parliament in March until the May elections (Associated Press). The intention is that this should allow the people to “determine whether the country aligns itself with the European Union and other Western groups” or whether it will “return to its isolationist past” (Associated Press). Although Tadic refuses to link Serbian EU status with the Kosovo issue, as time goes on, they seem inextricably linked, as membership in the EU would put the country in a better position to assert its position on Kosovo (Associated Press).
Conclusion
When Communism failed to unite the separate nations of Yugoslavia in the interest of larger political and economic aims, Serbia reacted with aggressive nationalism, spurred on by economic crisis and ethnic conflict. Milosevic rose to power in a time of great unrest, leading the country into war to fight for a “greater Serbia” beyond its present borders. The decade of Yugoslav wars ravaged Serbia economically and politically as it was hostile to the international community, and trade broke down between peasants and the urban centers, who blamed each other for their financial hardships (Thomas 166). Since Milosevic was ousted, Serbia has struggled to reassert itself in the international community, bolster up trade, and establish a connection with the West that could eventually lead to EU membership. Yet the same issues of nationalism and boundary definition are resurfacing since Kosovo declared its independence in February. The country is hoping that in the new parliament elections, citizens will vote “for the people who can tell anyone, including the EU, where are Serbia’s borders” (Associated Press).
Works Cited
Associated Press, The. “Serbia’s President Dissolves Parliament”. International Herald Tribune. March 13, 2008. April 24, 2008..
Batt, Judy. “The Question of Serbia”. Chaillot Papers. August 2005.
Gagnon, V. P. “Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability”. Council of Foreign Relations, Inc. 2004.
Gordy, Eric. “Serbia and Djindjic: War Crimes, Organized Crime and Trust in Public Institutions”. Problems of Post-Communism vol. 51, no. 3. May/June 2004. 10-17.
Gordy, Eric D. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives, The Pennsylvania State University. University Park, Pennsylvania, 1996.
Lazic, Mladen, and Laslo Sekelj. “Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. Europe-Asia Studies. September 1997. Vol. 49, Issue 6.
Lukic, Reneo. “From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenego”. Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After. Ed Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. University of Washington Press. Seattle. Washington, 2005. 55-94.
Jovanovic, Jela. “Nacional Reveals the Head Mafia Boss of the Balkans”. Nacional Neovisni News Magazin. 21 May 2001..
Milosavljevic, Olivera. “Yugoslavia as a Mistake”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 50-80.
“Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis Between The Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe”. Center for the Study of Democracy. 2004..
Pavlakovic, Vjeran. “Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and Afertwards”. Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After. Ed Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. University of Washington Press. Seattle. Washington, 2005. 13-54.
Perovic, Latinka. “The Flight from Modernization”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 109-122.
Pribicevic, Ognjen. “Serbia After Milosevic”. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol, 4, No. 1. January 2004. 107-118.
Ristic, Zoran. “Privatization and Direct Foreign Investment in Serbia”. South-East Europe Review. February 2004. 121-136.
Robinson, Matt. “Serbia Says Will Hold May Elections in Kosovo”. International Herald Tribune. March 31, 2008. April 24, 2008..
Rupnik, Jacques. “Yugoslavia After Milosevic”. Survival Vol.43, No 2. Summer 2001. 19-29.
Sekulic, Dusko, Garth Massey and Randy Hodson. “Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 83-97.
“Slobodan Milosevic”. Wikpedia, Inc. April 24, 2008. April 24, 2008..
“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. Wikipedia, Inc. 19 April 2008. 21 April 2008..
Stojanovic, Dubravka. “The Traumatic Circle of the Serbian Opposition”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 449-478.
Thomas, Robert. The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s. Columbia Press. New York, New York, 1999.
Redefining a Nation
Since the collapse of Communism, Serbia has undergone profound transformations, up to and including the physical definition of the state and its boundaries. From the dismantling of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Kosovo’s recent breakaway, it has struggled to establish itself politically, economically and culturally in post-Communist Europe. After the “transition from one illegitimate system (communism) to another illegitimate system (extreme nationalism)” (Pavlakovic 8), Serbia began to crack down on corruption and work towards a stable democracy, only to find itself in a new crisis with the secession of Kosovo. Considerable dissension over what direction the country should take at this critical point has led to the dissolution of the parliament, with new elections scheduled for May 15th. The issue of Kosovo is the end of a long chain of nationalist resurgence that has greatly shaped the situation Serbia, as the country strives to define itself in post-Communist Europe.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Corruption and Collapse
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, created after World War II, contained the now independent states of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and the disputed independent state of Kosovo (“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”). Leader Josep Broz Tito made Yugoslavia one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War (“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”). Under the slogan of “brotherhood and unity”, Tito employed market socialism in hopes that economic interests would supercede regional ethnic tensions (Gagnon 2). Yet although living standards and economic growth rate of Yugoslavia were among the highest in Eastern Europe, this would not be sufficient to hold the country together forever (Gagnon 2).
Under Communism, Yugoslavia was separated into largely autonomous districts, and “instead of the center running the entire economy, there were eight centers running eight economies” (Gagnon 3). Under this system, Serbia contained some of the most and least developed regions of Yugoslavia, and despite efforts to foster economic equality, poorly planned policies of investment and development focusing on heavy industry only widened the gap between them (Thomas 27). The greater Belgrade region was the largest manufacturing center in Yugoslavia, noted for its considerable consumer goods and food processing sector, however the province of Kosovo had high unemployment, up to 54% in the 1980s and its natural resources were largely squandered due to poor management (Thomas 27).
After Tito’s death, Yugoslavia became increasingly embroiled in ethnic tensions and burgeoning nationalism and the economy was by then in need of serious reform. “During the 1980s, the structural weaknesses of the Yugoslav economy were becoming increasingly evident” (Thomas 26). “In a situation of hyperinflation of over 10,000% yearly, falling production, high unemployment, a large foreign debt, domestic monetary chaos and accumulated structural economic problems,” Prime Minister Markovic's reform program attempted to privatize sectors of the Yugoslav economy, and centralize the monetary policy by putting it into the hands of the federal government (Lazic and Sekelj). The latter act however did not gain full political support, because in Slovenia and Croatia non-Communist political parties came to power in parliamentary elections in 1990, mandating the creation of independent states (Lazic and Sekelj). In this way, the economy became entangled in political and nationalist conflict that eventually led to the dissolution of the SFRY.
The Markovic reform program was aimed at creating an integrated Yugoslav market, and its failure sealed the fate of the republic, as reform conflicted with nationalist party interests (Gagnon 4). “The former Yugoslavia is a case where the integrative processes of state identity formation” ultimately failed (Sekulic et. al. 84). Furthermore, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences was among the most prominent critics of the federal government, claiming it supported an “anti-Serbian coalition in Yugoslavia” (Gagnon 5). It is at this point, in the late 1980s, that Slobodan Milosevic gained power, consolidating his control over the Serbian party organization by catering to nationalist sentiments that Serbia had been ill-served by the current political system (Gagnon 5).
Then, “in 1992, Yugoslavia formally dissolved in all out war” (Milosavljevic 51).
The Milosevic Era: Nationalism and the Outbreak of War
By 1992, four countries declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbian President Milosevic was opposed to the secession of these states and claimed the large minority of Serbs within their borders had the right to stay in Yugoslavia and that the Yugoslav Constitution gave the right of self-determination to populations (Serbs, Croats, etc) as a whole, not republics (Serbia, Croatia, etc) (Lukic 56). “In essence, this was about the concept of a Serbian Yugoslavia, politically dominated by the Serbian people,” a union forming “the Greater Serbia”, rather than an egalitarian federation, to which the other nations of Yugoslavia were not willing to subscribe (Stojanovic 461). He used confrontational rhetoric to insist that Serbian outside the Serb border were in danger, Moving from Communist ideology to nationalist ideology, “with nation replacing class…opponents of the regime became enemies of the state” (Gordy “The Culture of Power…” 12). This provoked extremists in Croatia to stage a Croatian Serb rebellion (Gagnon 15), and later Bosnia and Herzegovina was also thrust into war when Bosnian Serbs captured as much as 70% of the country (“Slobodan Milosevic”). The situation then deteriorated into a series of wars fought over the span of nearly a decade in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“Slobodan Milosevic”).
During this time, Serbia and Montenegro declared themselves the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and refused to apply for membership to international organizations, insisting that their new state was automatically entitled to those positions formerly held by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Lukic 57). “This absurd situation of perpetuating a nonexistent republic had repercussions in the FRY,” leaving it in a state of political limbo, with the flag of the defunct SFRY flying outside UN headquarters, although this was not the flag of the FRY (Lukic 57). Furthermore, it was partially excluded from UN activity, and suspended from other international organizations (Lukic 57). Additionally, Serbia became more and more distanced from Western European ideas and traditions over the course of the war. The premier newspaper Politika contained anti-Western sentiment, along with nationalist rhetoric in order to bolster support for the Serbian nation-state ideal and the war (Perovic 111). It would not be until after Milosevic that Serbia would again reach out to the West, and reapply for membership to international organizations.
Back at home, Serbia became highly controlled under Milosevic, and at the same time highly corrupt. The FRY was born into dramatic economic failure, and the government was “disinclined to institute any serious attempt at reform as any diminution of state control over the social and economic apparatus would also diminish” its power (Thomas 163-4). Furthermore, the ruling elite regained control of major enterprises that had become privatized before the dissolution of the SFRY (Lazic). Economic collapse forced many in the professional class to emigrate, and animosity between urban and agricultural sectors intensified, as peasants refused to sell their produce to city dwellers for worthless dinars, and blamed the lack of petrol and fertilizers on the inefficiency of urban bureaucrats (Thomas 166). Furthermore, the remnants of the previous command economy meant the presence of a strong black market which laid the groundwork for Milosevic’s government to “intentionally merge its law-enforcing institutions with organized crime to set up an extensive system of gray and black economies to circumvent sanctions” (“Partners in Crime…” 43). Thus the Serbian State Security Service (SDB) was highly corrupt under Milosevic, dealing with opposition to the regime, organizing paramilitary formations and channels for the networking of smuggling and money laundering (Jovanovic).
Despite the social and economic crisis in Serbia, war is what truly defined the Milosevic era, as it was interwoven with every aspect of life. Trafficking was often for arms to fight in Bosnia (“Partners in Crime”). War contributed to the deterioration of international relations in Serbia, and eventually led to the collapse of the FRY and the Milosevic regime (Thomas 251). Shortly after NATO intervention in Kosovar conflict in 1999, Milosevic was voted out of office, and in 2003, Serbia shifted definitions again to become the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, until 2006 when Montenegro seceded to become the newest independent country in the world, not counting the disputed situation of Kosovo (“Slobodan Milosevic”).
Post-Milosevic: Continued Conflict and Reform
Serbia has struggled greatly with reorienting its political and economic landscape since Milosevic. With the murder of President Zoran Djindjic by a member of Zemun clan in 2003, Serbia began a large scale crackdown on organized crime (Gordy, “Serbia and Djindjic…” 7), and also rounding up war criminals. It has proved difficult to dismantle the significant amount of corruption in the public and private sector (Ristic 1). However, despite the persistence of crime and corruption in the aftermath of Milosevic’s heavy hand of authoritarian control, Serbia also regained full membership in the UN— “its frontiers with neighbors were opened, the dinar became relatively stable, the country was admitted in the Council of Europe and it applied for membership in the Partnership for Peace” (Pribcevic 1). Furthermore, after the Yugoslav Wars, Serbia has been receiving more direct foreign investment and capital as it attempts to reform the economy (Ristic 15). Thus, like other countries in the Balkans, Serbia is looking to the West and the European Union for support and political inspiration (Rupnik 1), although recently, relations have been strained over the secession of Kosovo, which has proved the most contentious issue in recent Serbian politics.
Kosovo is a prime example of what can happen in areas without a clear nation-state. “Where state borders are contestable and unstable, liberal and democratic principles—the rights of individuals and their political equality as citizens—are eclipsed by the logically prior question: who belongs?” (Batt 14). Since the collapse of Communism, Serbia has struggled mightily with this question in its efforts to forge a Yugoslav union or a “greater Serbia”, and now, with Kosovo, it is raised again. In this instance, Serbia has been as yet unwilling to recognize Kosovo as a separate state, and plans to open polls there for Serbian elections in May (Robinson).
The Kosovo issue also poses an obstacle to Serbian integration into the European Union, as most countries in the EU recognize Kosovo as an independent country, among other issues including hiding war criminals, and problems with integrating the economy (Batt 33). Indeed, Kosovo’s secession is the reason that Boris Tadic dissolved the Parliament in March until the May elections (Associated Press). The intention is that this should allow the people to “determine whether the country aligns itself with the European Union and other Western groups” or whether it will “return to its isolationist past” (Associated Press). Although Tadic refuses to link Serbian EU status with the Kosovo issue, as time goes on, they seem inextricably linked, as membership in the EU would put the country in a better position to assert its position on Kosovo (Associated Press).
Conclusion
When Communism failed to unite the separate nations of Yugoslavia in the interest of larger political and economic aims, Serbia reacted with aggressive nationalism, spurred on by economic crisis and ethnic conflict. Milosevic rose to power in a time of great unrest, leading the country into war to fight for a “greater Serbia” beyond its present borders. The decade of Yugoslav wars ravaged Serbia economically and politically as it was hostile to the international community, and trade broke down between peasants and the urban centers, who blamed each other for their financial hardships (Thomas 166). Since Milosevic was ousted, Serbia has struggled to reassert itself in the international community, bolster up trade, and establish a connection with the West that could eventually lead to EU membership. Yet the same issues of nationalism and boundary definition are resurfacing since Kosovo declared its independence in February. The country is hoping that in the new parliament elections, citizens will vote “for the people who can tell anyone, including the EU, where are Serbia’s borders” (Associated Press).
Works Cited
Associated Press, The. “Serbia’s President Dissolves Parliament”. International Herald Tribune. March 13, 2008. April 24, 2008.
Batt, Judy. “The Question of Serbia”. Chaillot Papers. August 2005.
Gagnon, V. P. “Yugoslavia: Prospects for Stability”. Council of Foreign Relations, Inc. 2004.
Gordy, Eric. “Serbia and Djindjic: War Crimes, Organized Crime and Trust in Public Institutions”. Problems of Post-Communism vol. 51, no. 3. May/June 2004. 10-17.
Gordy, Eric D. The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives, The Pennsylvania State University. University Park, Pennsylvania, 1996.
Lazic, Mladen, and Laslo Sekelj. “Privatisation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. Europe-Asia Studies. September 1997. Vol. 49, Issue 6.
Lukic, Reneo. “From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenego”. Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After. Ed Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. University of Washington Press. Seattle. Washington, 2005. 55-94.
Jovanovic, Jela. “Nacional Reveals the Head Mafia Boss of the Balkans”. Nacional Neovisni News Magazin. 21 May 2001.
Milosavljevic, Olivera. “Yugoslavia as a Mistake”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 50-80.
“Partners in Crime: The Risks of Symbiosis Between The Security Sector and Organized Crime in Southeast Europe”. Center for the Study of Democracy. 2004.
Pavlakovic, Vjeran. “Serbia Transformed? Political Dynamics in the Milosevic Era and Afertwards”. Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milosevic and After. Ed Sabrina P. Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. University of Washington Press. Seattle. Washington, 2005. 13-54.
Perovic, Latinka. “The Flight from Modernization”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 109-122.
Pribicevic, Ognjen. “Serbia After Milosevic”. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies Vol, 4, No. 1. January 2004. 107-118.
Ristic, Zoran. “Privatization and Direct Foreign Investment in Serbia”. South-East Europe Review. February 2004. 121-136.
Robinson, Matt. “Serbia Says Will Hold May Elections in Kosovo”. International Herald Tribune. March 31, 2008. April 24, 2008.
Rupnik, Jacques. “Yugoslavia After Milosevic”. Survival Vol.43, No 2. Summer 2001. 19-29.
Sekulic, Dusko, Garth Massey and Randy Hodson. “Who Were the Yugoslavs? Failed Sources of a Common Identity in the Former Yugoslavia”. American Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 1994), pp. 83-97.
“Slobodan Milosevic”. Wikpedia, Inc. April 24, 2008. April 24, 2008.
“Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”. Wikipedia, Inc. 19 April 2008. 21 April 2008.
Stojanovic, Dubravka. “The Traumatic Circle of the Serbian Opposition”. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Ed. Nebojsa Popov. Central European University Press. Plymouth, United Kingdom, 2000. 449-478.
Thomas, Robert. The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s. Columbia Press. New York, New York, 1999.
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
More Troops in Kosovo
Britain plans to send 600 troops to Kosovo NATO peacekeeping duty. They will be the standby reserve of NATO in the region for the next 6 months. The influence of NATO in Kosovo as a peacekeeping force has been important ever since the end of the war in Kosovo in 1999.
The quotes in this article are pretty funny:http://news.uk.msn.com/Article.aspx?cp-documentid=8197133
Ever since the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the situation has been "tense". Um, yeah.
Friday, April 25, 2008
Serbia in Cooperation Talks With UN
Talks in Belgrade are meant to solve the "many technical problems" that have arisen since February. This includes the polls issue in Kosovo for the may elections...
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=49683
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2008&mm=04&dd=23&nav_id=49683
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
Same Old, Same Old
Although this is a very critical time in Serbia, the news this week has been the same old story--is Serbia headed toward EU membership? how does that fit into its relationship with Russia? what about kosovo and the upcoming elections? the UN security council vote is still undecided about their stance on the polls in Kosovo issue. News may be in limbo until the May 15th elections. So Hold your breath and count to....22 days.
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
Fan Killed in Soccer Riots
One person was fatally shot and others were wounded in a brawl between rival soccer fans in Serbia. Fan riots are considered quite common especially between organized gangs who are often manipulated by nationalist parties. What a crazy dynamic!
Full article (still very short) here:
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5gQTBFQ7pmFShmCEB3ZoTcH0xbQyg
Full article (still very short) here:
http://canadianpress.google.com/article/ALeqM5gQTBFQ7pmFShmCEB3ZoTcH0xbQyg
Wednesday, April 9, 2008
UN Cautions Serbia Against Local Elections in Kosovo
The UN has taken its position on the local elections proposed in Kosovo on May 11 as Serbia considers it part of their country. It is not clear how their opposition will come into play either by use of force, or just invalidation of votes cast.
The article is actually slightly confusing as the UN claims to have "no problem with Kosovar Serbs voting" it's just the polls held IN Kosovo that are the problem??
Full article:
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0927466920080409?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0
The article is actually slightly confusing as the UN claims to have "no problem with Kosovar Serbs voting" it's just the polls held IN Kosovo that are the problem??
Full article:
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL0927466920080409?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0
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